New Book: Country and Political Risk

Posted on June 07, 2005

The Emerging Markets Have Emerged

By Sam Wilkin, Editor in Chief
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The acquisition of IBM’s PC business by China’s Lenovo was no red herring. The emerging markets have, at long last, emerged.

It looks, at first, like just another bubble in emerging equities. Following the acquisition of IBM’s PC business by China’s Lenovo, Chinese businesses are in the headlines. The usual suspects are up – Brazil, Russia, Turkey. Americans who once feared a rising Japan now talk of a rising India. All of which usually means, sooner or later, another emerging market meltdown. But there is an important difference.

That difference is Nigeria. Or, more specifically, the fact that Nigeria became, in 2004, the third largest global market for Guinness breweries – trailing only Ireland and Britain in Guinness’s global sales and edging out the United States. So odd a fact cannot be dismissed as a fluke. There are no speculative bubbles in beer consumption.

Nigeria’s unlikely rise is, in fact, the harbinger of a trend that is changing the global business landscape. That trend is not a simple expansion of wealth. Since the early 1990s emerging markets enthusiasts have made much of the fact that the combined output of the developing economies is, by some measures, roughly on par with that of the rich world. But this sizeable economic output does not make the emerging markets relevant to global business – any more than the Warsaw Pact economies were relevant to global business during the days of the USSR.

To be relevant, economies must be integrated. Until recently the emerging markets were cordoned off by barriers of politics, policy, culture, and sheer economic difference. These barriers were as real as any iron curtain. Trade flows between countries with different languages, political systems, and average incomes have long been dramatically lower than standard economic models would predict.

A famous illustration of this is the case of Whirlpool India. In the late 1980’s, Whirlpool invested heavily in India, lured by talk of a middle class some 200-million strong. But impenetrable differences of culture and consumer income separated Whirlpool from its intended market. Labor-saving devices made little sense in a country with a labor surplus. Electronic appliances caused more problems than they solved for customers who suffered frequent power cuts. By the mid-1990’s, Whirlpool India was losing over $10 million a year. Such all-too-common stories led many Western executives to conclude that emerging market consumers were little more than a mirage.

But this is changing. When Guinness went to Nigeria, no doubt with low expectations, it stumbled into the ideal market for its product. Guinness, originally brewed to withstand long sea voyages, was well-matched to the refrigeration breakdowns and road delays that plague Nigeria’s distribution system. This was coupled with good strategy. During Nigeria’s frequent economic crises, Guinness counterintuitively but cleverly increased its investment in the country, acquiring assets and taking market share from floundering competitors on the cheap. To this add low-cost local production and a well-honed marketing campaign, and you have a formula for outsize success.

Thus Guinness tapped into a market that, prior to its efforts, was so far from the mind of global businesspeople that it might as well have been on Mars. There are 130 million Nigerians, and though they remain poor, their combined spending power exceeds that of all of Ireland. In the struggle between brewers like Diageo, which owns Guinness, and Anheuser-Busch, Heineken and others, the Nigerian market suddenly matters.

Countries that once served only as the setting for resource extraction ventures are now integrating via offshoring, outsourcing, and as consumer markets. Thailand is now the world’s second-largest producer of pickup trucks; Indonesia the fifth-largest market for cigarettes; and US insurer AIG derives about half of its operating profits in its core life insurance business from Asia.

This means a fundamental shift in the competitive landscape for global business. One telling indicator of this is the degree to which emerging market firms are no longer just acquisition targets, but are strong competitors in their own right. India’s Tata Group bought the telecoms arm of US-based Tyco, Mexican cement giant Cemex acquired Britain’s RMC, and Chinese firms have been eyeing targets worldwide. Home-grown emerging market firms have exploited their countries’ hidden wealth to attain global scale.

To be sure, emerging market equities may fall just as quickly as they have risen. Bubbles and busts are not things of the past. But the trends of economic integration are deep and not easily reversed. China has been the world’s most favored destination for foreign direct investment for three years running, in A.T. Kearney’s rankings. India, riding its outsourcing boom, has now moved up to second place, displacing the United States. And then there is the rise of Nigeria in the ranks of beer consuming nations. Though unheralded, this is no less a signal to the globe’s captains of industry – at long last, the emerging markets have emerged.

Posted on February 01, 2005

Microsoft's Kimchi Problem

By Sam Wilkin, Editor in Chief
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Microsoft, known for its unerring command of business strategy, has recently stumbled badly in markets on opposite sides of the world. In Brazil, China, and Europe, governments have announced anti-Microsoft initiatives. Why are things suddenly going wrong? The answer can be found in a little-known slipup Microsoft made in South Korea many years ago.

Microsoft's success in the U.S. market is uncanny and ongoing. But in countries on opposite sides of the world, things sometimes go wrong for the wizards of Redmond. Brazilian authorities have announced plans to convert five federal government ministries from Windows to mandatory use of open-source software. In Beijing, representatives of the Chinese, Japanese and Korean governments have been meeting to hash out a joint plan to promote the usage of Linux. And in Europe, the competition authorities handed down a monopoly ruling and fine that cut deeply into Microsoft's global earnings.

This may seem out of character for Microsoft, a company known for its unerring command of strategy. Or perhaps coincidental.

But far from it. Consider the telling blunder Microsoft made in the Korean software market in the summer of 1998.

That summer, in the face of determined local competition, Microsoft was struggling with a minority market share. Then the company's strategists hit on a bold plan. The Korean software firm that dominated the local word processing market was bleeding cash.
Because of rampant software piracy, many Koreans were using the company's software, but few were paying for it. Cash-rich Microsoft negotiated a deal in which the Korean company would discontinue producing its software in return for a bailout from Microsoft -- leaving the word-processing market open for domination by Microsoft Word.

An aggressive strategy. But what Microsoft failed to understand is that there is something unique about the Korean written language. Most alphabets have evolved organically over the centuries and aren't related to national boundaries. (The letters A through Z are used, with some modification, to inscribe everything from Finnish to Turkish.) Korea's alphabet, called Hangul, was, by contrast, decreed into being in the 1400s by a Korean king who declared, "Koreans are in great need of their own letters."

When Japan forcibly colonized Korea in the early 1900s, it outlawed use of Hangul and forced Koreans to take Japanese names. Hence when Korea was liberated at the end of the Second World War, writing in Korea's unique national alphabet became a potent -- indeed spectacularly potent -- symbol of independence, resistance to foreign domination, and patriotism. So much so, that the government established "Hangul Day,"
Oct. 9, as a national holiday. (It's probably the world's only holiday in honor of an alphabet.)

Lee Chan-jin, the man who produced the first Korean-language word-processing program -- that is, the first program to make composition in Hangul on the computer possible -- became something of a national hero. Indeed, in a late-1990s poll of Korean college students asking about their role models, Lee took second place, only running behind the chairman of Hyundai.

When Microsoft's plans for the forcible retirement of Lee Chan-jin's software were made public, the backlash was spectacular. Korean editorialists penned personal attacks on Bill Gates. Outraged Koreans actually donated money to venture capitalists making a local counter-offer. A grass-roots campaign against Microsoft sprang up. Microsoft was soon forced to abandon its strategy and concede defeat. In the aftermath, patriotic Korean software users, incensed by Microsoft's actions, for the first time began to pay for their software, and that sent Microsoft's local competition on a brief but meteoric upward rise at the end of the 1990s.

To be sure, these extraordinary events had little impact on Microsoft's global performance in 1998. But they revealed a critical flaw that is now returning to haunt the company: When devising international strategy, Microsoft ignores the kimchi.

Kimchi is a Korean staple dish of cabbage fermented in garlic, chilies and vinegar until it is spicy, blood-red in color, and gives off a pungent aroma.
Unlike the Big Mac and Coke, the official food and drink combo of globalization, kimchi is still a quintessentially local dish, associated with a particular country and people. While researching a recent book on global business strategy, my co-authors and I came to see kimchi as the symbol for the idiosyncrasies of local politics, economics and culture. To get Korea right, you have to know about the kimchi.

In a strategic context, understanding the kimchi means more than retouching a U.S. product or marketing campaign with a little local flavor. (In Seoul, for instance, McDonald's will sell you a kimchi burger.) Nor is it enough to wine and dine the local leadership. Microsoft, especially in China, has spent ample time and treasure on this.

Rather, it means adjusting business strategies to suit foreign peculiarities. When strategies from a home market are transported abroad without modification, they may underperform or even backfire spectacularly, as happened to Microsoft in Korea. There are national differences in politics, wealth, commercial environment, infrastructure, history, language, and so on.

The result is a stark and persistent pattern in international trade and investment flows: Despite the ongoing decline in transport and communication costs, the volume of business transacted between distant countries remains stubbornly low. It is no longer hard to get products to distant overseas markets. But it is still hard to do well in those markets.

When Microsoft and many other companies craft international strategies, too often they ignore such concerns. The kimchi is not a factor they recognize.
Instead they attempt to replicate highly successful U.S. strategies overseas. Microsoft exploits software's economics to attain market dominance in one category, and then spreads to neighboring product categories by bundling them with the first successful product.

But this approach, as the events in Korea hinted, and this year's setbacks in Latin America, Asia and Europe are now proving, does not always work. Microsoft's U.S. strategy already pushes the boundaries of political and judicial acceptability. In foreign markets, this strategy almost inevitably involves crushing national champions and fuels the perception
-- however unjustified -- that "monopoly profits" are being stripped from local hands and shipped back to Redmond.

Microsoft declined to comment for this article. In the company's defense, however, it is important to note that in Southeast Asia, Microsoft has just launched an initiative offering stripped-down local-language versions of Windows at sharply reduced prices. That is a step in exactly the right direction, a strategy in tune with local markets. This praise is not yet fully deserved, though: Microsoft only started the program after the Thai government began distributing a low-cost computer pre-loaded with Linux to its citizens.

Could Microsoft get more in tune with the kimchi? It certainly could, but that would involve some strategic innovation. Partnering with national champions, instead of crushing them, for example. That may contradict the company's stunningly successful modus operandi in America. But a strategy that ignores the kimchi, at best, dramatically increases Microsoft's global risks. At worst, it may undermine Microsoft's international expansion.

[This article originally appeared in Barron's on September 20, 2004 - Ed.]

Posted on January 18, 2005

Will the Tsunami Bring a Wave of Instability to Asia?

By Sam Wilkin, Editor in Chief
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The tsunami, which left as many as 160,000 dead, hit countries with a tenuous hold on political stability – a province of Indonesia that is home to a violent separatist movement, a region in Sri Lanka that is currently at peace but has fought a long-running civil war. Crises, whether natural or man-made, tend to beget political instability. Will the political aftershocks of the tsunami be even stronger than the initial quake?

An earthquake of devastating magnitude struck, in 1976, not far from Beijing. As the survivors’ stories trickled out, the world rushed to China’s assistance. But the Chinese government refused all outside aid and claimed the situation was well in hand. Partly as a result, the casualty figures were, in the end, astronomical. At least 242,000 died – the official figure, released years later – and some reputable sources claim that over 700,000 perished.

The problem was the timing. It has been a basic tenet of Chinese political philosophy for more than two millennia that governments rule with the “mandate of heaven,” and that natural disasters – including floods, droughts and earthquakes – are a heaven-sent signal that this mandate has been revoked and the leadership had failed. In 1976, Mao was on his deathbed, and the unsteady Chinese government feared the political consequences of the quake. Lest anyone conclude their mandate was up, the government tried to cover up the earthquake’s magnitude, at the expense of Chinese lives.

But then, Confucian teachings aside, there is ample precedent that natural disasters beget instability. Simon Winchester popularized the argument that the volcanic explosion which destroyed the Indonesian island of Krakatoa in 1884 lead to a bloody peasant’s revolt against Dutch colonial rule, and fostered the growth of militant Islam in that country.

In 1954, following a devastating hurricane, the Haitian government’s outright theft of international relief aid was so blatant that the president was eventually driven from office. In 1970, following a devastating typhoon that killed perhaps 400,000 people, the Pakistani government’s perceived failure to respond helped fuel a civil war between eastern and western Pakistan. (The typhoon hit the east; the unresponsive government was based in the west.) This led to the secession of Bangladesh.

Just as famously, a 1972 earthquake fueled the growth of an opposition movement that eventually overthrew the government of Nicaragua. The bungled response of the US-backed government of Iran to a 1978 quake allowed the country’s Islamic revolutionaries to rally support. And “twin” earthquakes in Mexico City in 1985 assisted the rise of the leftist PRD, which gained power in local government and very nearly the presidency.

After the Asian tsunami, Indonesia is an obvious candidate for instability. The last major catastrophe to strike Indonesia was not natural, it was man-made – an economic collapse following the Asian financial crisis. This led to an orgy of political violence by Indonesian Muslims against the country’s ethnic Chinese that left over 1,000 dead.

Catastrophes, whatever their form, tend to leave people disoriented and in search of an explanation for their suffering – an explanation which will tell them how they can lessen their pain. Indonesian rabble-rousers blamed the country’s economic collapse, erroneously, on Indonesians of Chinese descent, and Indonesia’s ethnic Malays rose up to kill their Chinese countrymen.

The risk, of course, is that the trauma of the tsunami will give separatist rebels in Indonesia’s hard-hid Aceh province new political life. The rebels can blame the people’s suffering on the government’s failure to provide for them. And yet, given the events of the past year, this risk is limited. Under cover of the global war on terror, the Indonesian government has conducted a bloody, heavy-handed crackdown in Aceh that has weakened the rebels. This continues even now – the Indonesian government announced that all foreign aid workers in Aceh would be accompanied by the Indonesian army, for instance. In the near term at least, the greater danger is of an uncontrolled crackdown than an uncontrolled rebellion.

In Sri Lanka, the tsunami may well have a more profound impact. The Tamil Tiger rebels in northern Sri Lanka have waged a decades-long civil war against the Sri Lankan government that has killed over 64,000 people. The secret to the Tiger’s longevity has been tremendous external funding.

In past decades, over a hundred thousand ethnic Tamils have fled Sri Lanka, chiefly as a result of anti-Tamil violence by the country’s majority Sinhalese. These Tamils – now residents of the US, UK, Canada, and other rich countries – have sent tremendous sums of money to the Tamil rebels fighting at home. (At one time, Canada’s ethnic Tamils alone sent their countrymen over $20 million per year.) These funds have allowed the Tamil Tigers to buy the arms and supplies necessary to run a bloody guerilla war.

All this stopped after September 11th. Governments worldwide cracked down on terrorist funding, and ethnic Tamils overseas were no longer comfortable funding violence, even for a cause they believed in. (One of the Tigers’ main tactics is suicide bombing.) With their funds drying up, the Tigers laid down their arms and entered peace talks with the Sri Lankan government in 2002.

The danger is that the tsunami could overturn this arrangement, first because the quake’s trauma provides the Tigers with new recruits, and second because the funds have come back. Seeing the disaster on television, overseas Tamils are once again sending huge sums home – some of which will doubtless be misappropriated by the Tigers.

To be sure, in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka, there is reason for hope. Consider the quake that struck Turkey in 1999 – it threatened to cause instability, but in the end, did much more to improve relations between Greece and Turkey by causing an outpouring of international sympathy. Natural disasters bring out the best in people as well as the worst. Especially if the international community stays closely involved, there is at least a chance that the political aftershocks of the tsunami, even in Indonesia and Sri Lanka, will be manageable.

Posted on January 04, 2005

Iraq Can Help Stabilize the Middle East

By Sam Wilkin, Editor in Chief
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This month, Countryrisk.com’s Editor returns to his desk after a brief absence to finish a new book. In the new year, hope springs eternal: while Iraq seems a looming disaster, there is at least the potential that US efforts there could help stabilize the Middle East. The key is to apply lessons learned in the reconstruction of Japan.

All eyes are on Iraq’s upcoming elections as the test case for America’s plan to bring to democracy to the Middle East. But elections alone do not build stable democracies. The US is failing to learn from history – and missing an opportunity to put the stability of the Middle East on a firmer foundation.

In politics, it always matters who has the money, and in the Middle East, the wrong people have it. For decades the region’s political agenda has been set by oil-rich princes, tithe-rich ayatollahs, and aid-rich generals – to the detriment of both political openness and economic development.

It is not easy for outsiders to change this kind of politics, but it is possible. Consider the lessons learned in Japan. Recent books by Aaron Forsberg and Sayuri Shimizu have shown that it was not just Japanese industriousness and ingenuity that made post-war Japan such a success. It was the unusual form of US aid.

In Japan, as in Iraq, the early days were dark and difficult. Japan was economically devastated, politically authoritarian, and hopelessly exotic to its American occupiers. Two years into the occupation, Japan’s economy was stagnant and inflation was rising.

But then the Americans made an abrupt change of strategy. In 1948, National Security Council policy statement NSC 13/2 abandoned attempts to reform Japan’s politics and economy along US lines and made reviving Japan as a stable and prosperous anti-Communist ally the “primary goal” of US policy.

US funds poured into Japan, but not in the form of aid. During the decade surrounding the Korean War, the US military showered Japanese firms with supply and service contracts – in excess of $500 million each year; in some years close to $1 billion. In aggregate, this vastly exceeded the $2 billion in aid the US gave Japan’s government during the occupation. In 1952, a whopping 70 percent of Japan’s commercial exports were US military procurement orders.

The result was that in Japan, private businesses – not soldiers, politicians or priests – had all the money. And these businesses started to set the political agenda. In the 1950s, Japan’s firms lobbied their government for good infrastructure, a well-educated workforce – the things Japanese businesses needed to export to America’s newly opened, unimaginably wealthy, but highly competitive markets.

It is a political dynamic that is all too rare in the developing world. Japan’s elites lobbied for policies that would make not just them, but also their country, rich. In 1958, Japan’s three largest Japanese business associations colluded to pressure their government. But this was good pressure: their chief demand was an ongoing trade dialogue with America. In 1959 alone, Japan’s exports to the US grew by 52 percent. The country’s meteoric rise was under way.

To be sure, applying these lessons to the Middle East will be far from easy. But in the long term, it is this kind of politics – the politics of institutions and interest groups – that makes a country a success or a failure. Great leaders are both rare and temporary. Constitutions are mere pieces of paper until imbued with the weight of history.

A central goal of US policy in the Middle East should be to put money in the hands of the region’s private businesses. Efforts thus far have amounted to political window dressing. Halliburton, Bechtel, and other US contractors were instructed to farm out work to Iraqi and Middle Eastern subcontractors. But US firms, understandably, specialize in rebuilding power grids, not nurturing foreign industry. A watchdog group funded by George Soros found that, for 39 reconstruction contracts awarded in the past year, each with a value in excess of $5 million, only two percent of the revenues actually went to Iraqi companies.

No matter what, billions of US dollars have been spent in Iraq, and billions more will likely be required. The way to achieve the maximum policy impact with these funds is to distribute the benefits in the region. Reconstruction funds, including, as much as possible, military procurement, should go, first and foremost, to Middle Eastern firms. That will mean providing generous capital and technical assistance and relaxing standards and requirements. But that is the way to change who has the money in the Middle East, and create an interest group – outward-looking private businesses – that could at long last change the dynamics of the region for the better.

[In 2005, this column will appear every other Tuesday. -Ed.]